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Crime and Punishment: The Eighth
Amendment's Proportionality Guarantee Mter
Harmelin v. Michigan
I.

INTRODUCTION

The political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote,
"The first of all laws is to respect the laws: the severity of
penalties is only a vain resource, invented by little minds in
order to substitute terror for that respect which they have
no means of obtaining." 1 Unfortunately, the mentality to
which Rousseau referred manifests itself with increasing
frequency as state and federal legislators try in vain to
reduce criminal activity. The quintessential example of this
type of legislation is Michigan's drug possession law. The
Michigan statute imposes a mandatory life sentence without
possibility of parole for defendants convicted of possessing
650 or more grams of any cocaine mixture, regardless of the
purity of the mixture or the defendant's degree of culpability
and criminal record. 2 The constitutionality of similar laws
in other states has been vigorously and successfully challenged.3 However, during its 1990 term the Supreme Court
reversed this trend by upholding the constitutionality of
Michigan's "major controlled substance offense" statute. 4
Harmelin v. Michigan 5 raises serious doubts about the
future of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee.
While there was no majority, a reading of the Court's and
concurring Justices' opinions strongly suggests that this
Court cannot be relied upon to safeguard the fundamental

1.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Dlf->COURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 119 (G.D.H.
Cole trans., 175R).
2.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
3.
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (sustaining an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a South Dakota recidivist statute on the grounds that a sentence of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole was disproportionate); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that it was cruel and unusual punishment
to imprison a defendant for drug addiction).
4.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 26RO (1991).
5.
ld.
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principle that criminal punishments must be proportional to
the crime for which they are imposed. 6
This Note examines Harmelin's implications for proportionality analysis within the Eighth Amendment and what
action the Court should take if it should revisit this issue.
Part II reviews the historical antecedents of the Eighth
Amendment, the evolution of proportionality analysis in both
capital and non-capital Eighth Amendment cases, and the
status of proportionality analysis within the Eighth Amendment prior to Harmelin. Part III provides the facts of
Harmelin v. Michigan and the reasoning of the Court, concurring Justices, and dissent. Part IV analyzes Harmelin's
implications and the proper role of proportionality analysis
in Eighth Amendment adjudication. Finally, this Note concludes that our society's conception of humanity and justice,
and the Court's incongruent handling of proportionality in
capital and non-capital Eighth Amendment cases, mandates
recognition of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality guarantee in all cases.

II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF PROPORTIONALITY
AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.

This Note will use two different approaches to constitutional interpretation. The first, a fixed historical approach, 7
must be considered because the Supreme Court has clearly
manifest its proclivity for this line of analysis. 8 However,

Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a ThPory of Limited Punishment: An ExaminaEi~?hth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 85:3-54 (1972).
7.
When applied to the Eighth Amendment, this method "attempts to ascertain
'the particular abuses that the Framers of the Constitution had in mind to correct
[by looking to] those immemorial usages in England that were not rejected by the
Colonies . . . .'" Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth
Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the
Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 78:3, 786
(1971\). However, this method of constitutional interpretation should not be exclusively relied upon. This very narrow intent-based analysis has led individual Justices, and at times the whole Court, to "suspect, if not invalid, and to inconsistent,
if not incompatible, methods and explanations in applying the theory of the 'intent
of the Framers' to the interpretation of the Constitution."
6.

tion of thP

!d. at 787.
8.
The Court's inclination to rely on the historical antecedents of the "cruel
and unusual punishments" clause in interpreting the Eighth Amendment is plainly
illustrated by Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin. First, Justice Scalia accurately
observed, "SolPm based its conclusion principally upon the proposition that a right
to be free from disproportionate punishments was embodied within the 'cruel and
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there is some disagreement regarding the Court's preference
for this more static, historical mode. Not only has the Court
mandated a more flexible approach for itself, 9 but it has
applied the principle often enough that at least one commentator has observed, "[T]he Court has not attempted to
interpret this provision of the Constitution in a purely historical or static manner but has accepted the concept that it
must develop over time." 10 Thus, rather than endeavoring
to resolve the conflicts over which method of constitutional
interpretation is to be preferred or which has been most
often applied by the Court, this Note analyzes the Eighth
Amendment and its antecedents under both interpretative
models.
The starting point for both methods is consideration of
the historical antecedents of the Eight Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause. Although a detailed history of the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments" exceeds the scope of this paper/ 1 the evolution of this princi-

unusual punishments' provision of the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, and
was incorporated, with that language, in the Eighth Amendment." Harmelin, 111 S.
Ct. at 26R6. Secondly, Justice Scalia's extensive efforts to historically justify his
opinion in Harmelin strongly imply that the Court is still inclined in this direction.
See, id. at 2686-2699. Finally, it should be noted that generally, this is the Court's
preferred approach to the Eighth Amendment. "In its search for purposeful standards to give meaning to the eighth amendment, the Supreme Court has usually
employed the method of legal historical analysis as its key tool in the process of
constitutional interpretation." Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 7, at 792.
9.
The Court has clearly recognized that flexibility in constitutional interpretation is essential.
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient
in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and
be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights
declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized.
The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
10.
John B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20 SETON HALL L. REV.
47R, 4R4 (1990).
11.
Comprehensive histories of the English Declaration of Rights and the
Eighth Amendment are readily available. Most notable in the context of proportionality analysis are Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980); LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPI' OF CRUEL AND
UNUSlJAL PUNISHMENT (1975); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:'' The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969).
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ple during the past century can be traced and merits brief
reVIew.
The "cruel and unusual punishment" concept has been
developing for centuries. It apparently originated with King
Alfred in the tenth century (A.D. 900). 12 Approximately
three hundred years later the principle was included in the
Magna Carta (A.D. 1215) which "contained three provisions
dealing with the concept of disproportionate punishments."13 Three centuries later that principle was codified
into English law in A.D. 1533. 14 However, it was not until
the English Declaration of Rights (A.D. 1688) that the concept took the form with which we now familiar. In fact, the
English Declaration is the immediate progenitor of our
Eighth Amendment. 15 Borrowing from the English Declaration the principle was included in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights (A.D. 1776), most other state constitutions, the
Virginia Proposed Amendments to the Constitution (A.D.
1788), and on June 8, 1789 James Madison offered a slightly modified version of the Virginia proposal as an amendment to the United States Constitution. 16 Finally, "on December 15, 1791 the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
became the Eighth Amendment and formally part of the law
of the land." 17 Because the Declaration of Rights is the
most immediate predecessor to the Eighth Amendment, it
should be the first step in any historical analysis of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

A. The English Declaration of Rights
The relationship between the English Declaration of
Rights and the Eighth Amendment is well established. In
fact, the nexus between these two bodies of law is such,
that it is rare to read about the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause" without first reading about its English

12.
Berkson, supra note 11, at 159.
13.
!d. at 3.
14.
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 2::!6 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1972).
15.
"The eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was
taken directly from the British Declaration of Rights of 16R8 . . . ." Wheeler, supra
note 6, at 8:19.
16.
"Amendment proposed by Madison . . . : 'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'"
fi THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1008-09 (Edwin D. Webb ed., 1980).
Berkson, supra note 11, at 8.
17.
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forerunner. However, while it is virtually undisputed that
the Declaration of Rights was the model for early American
state constitutions, 18 and ultimately the Bill of Rights, 19
substantial controversy continues to surround the meaning
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. This controversy is best understood in terms of the two major areas of
disagreement: 1) What was intended by the English
Declaration's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments"? 2) How did the American Framers understand the
prohibition, and what was their intent in adopting the
Eighth Amendment?
The "cruel and unusual punishments" clause in the Declaration of Rights essentially codified preexisting legal principles.~w Therefore, it is significant to note that evidence
indicates proportionality was among those principles the
English framers sought to reinforce by adopting that document. "The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
was based on the longstanding principle of English law that
the punishment should fit the crime. That is, the punishment should not be, by reason of its excessive length or
severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."21
There is also substantial circumstantial evidence to support
this conclusion. Notably, at the time of the Declaration of
Rights, not only did "punishments involving torture and

1H.
"Following its inclusion in the Virginia constitution, eight other states
adopted the clause, the federal government inserted it into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and it became the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791." Granucci, ;;upra note 11, at 840.
19.
ld.
20.
ld. at 847-60.
21.
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 14, at 236. "[P]rior to adoption of
the Bill of Rights of 1689 England had developed a common law prohibition
against excessive punishments in any form." Granucci, supra note 11, at R47.
The English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to the imposition of punishments which were unauthorized by statute and outside the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties.

!d. at 860.
The inhibition was incorporated into the English Bill of Rights in order to
restrict the degree of punishment, and not to restrict the mode of inflicting it. This is clearly established by an examination of early English
documents and by analyzing the events immediately prior to and following its adoption in 16R9.
Berkson, ;;upra note 11, at 1fi9.
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mutilation [continue] to be legal in cases where such punishments were deemed proportionate to the crime,"22 but
infliction of the "[b]rutal penalties continued."23
However, this conclusion regarding proportionality's
place in the Declaration of Rights is not without its detractors. At least one commentator, Charles Walter Schwartz,
has posited two reasons to believe that proportionality was
not guaranteed by the English Declaration. First, he argued
that "[d]isproportionate punishment continued to occur with
great frequency following enactment of the English Bill of
Rights." 24 The only evidence adduced to support this assertion is that the number of offenses labeled as capital crimes
increased significantly between 1689 and 1800. However,
this fact does little to support Schwartz' conclusion that
disproportionate punishments were commonplace. The number of capital crimes in England in 1800, as compared to
England in 1992, may be easily explained by acknowledging
that Britain's conceptions of crime and proportionality have
evolved as the framers of the Declaration intended. Furthermore, it must be remembered that disproportionality is a
determination that must be based on contemporary mores
and theories of punishment. Thus, the mere fact that some
crimes that were labeled "capital" at the end of the eighteenth century are not so labeled today, does not support
the conclusion that the original label and attendant punishment were disproportionate. Significantly, Schwartz provides
no reason to believe that the labeling of crimes or the imposition of punishments in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries was arbitrary and capricious, and considered disproportionate by any group at that time.
Schwartz' second argument is that there is no evidence
that proportionality was mentioned in the parliamentary
debate preceding adoption of the Declaration of Rights. 25
However, this unsupported assertion is clearly contrary to
the historical evidence, which reflects the English framers'
intent to prohibit disproportionate punishments. Therefore,
because the English Declaration of Rights was clearly intended to proscribe disproportionate punishments, reason

22.
23.
24.
2fi.

SOURCES CW OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 14, at 286.
Berkson, supra note 11, at 3.
Schwartz, supra note 11, at :380.
ld. at 381.

I
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dictates that rejection of proportionality analysis within the
Eighth Amendment must be premised on the American
Framers' renunciation of the principle, not on the historical
fallacy that the English Declaration of Rights was not intended to proscribe disproportionate punishments. 26
B.

The American Framers and the Eighth Amendment

While some have argued that there is insufficient historical evidence to determine the Framers' understanding of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and their intent
in adopting the Eighth Amendment, there is a substantial
body of historical data to aid in the resolution of these
questions. There are Congressional Records of the debates
regarding the Bill of Rights, correspondence between delegates during the ratification process, the state proposals for
amending the Constitution and the individual states' constitutions. While each of these alone may be inadequate to
establish the Framers' intent, together, particularly when
combined with records of the state ratification debates, there
is "sufficient contemporary comment to establish the interpretation which the Framers placed on the words 'cruel and
unusual."'27
While there is disagreement over the intended role of
proportionality within the Eighth Amendment, the number
of answers to the question is limited. Because there is a
consensus that the Framers' intended to proscribe "cruel and
unusual" modes of punishment, 28 resolution of the ques-

26.
In fact, in Harmelin, Justice Scalia makes a very similar argument. Although his rationale is somewhat different, Justice Scalia contends, "Unless one
accepts the notion of a blind incorporation, however, the ultimate question is not
what 'cruel and unusual punishments' meant in the Declaration of Rights, but
what its meaning was to the Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment."
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2691 (1991).
27.
Granucci, supra note 11, at 841.
2R.
"Since the Amendment was passed with almost no debate at all, all we can
say with certainty is that the Framers thought they were proscribing torture and
other barbarous punishments." WILLIAM COHEN & JOHN KAPLAN, BILL OF RIGIITS,
726 (1976). Unfortunately the case law in this area reflects the same lack of historical precision. "Of the large number of cases decided which have interpreted the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, several areas of
significant agreement can be found. Among these is that the prohibition forbids
every form of barbarism in meting out punishment that can be devised."
THE VIRGINIA COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GoV'T, NOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED 16 (1965).
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tions regarding proportionality within the Amendment can
have only one of two results. Either the American Framers
completely altered the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause from that intended by its English authors by prohibiting undesirable methods rather than disproportionate degrees of punishment, or the Americans expanded the scope of the guarantee to protect against barbarous and excessive punishments.
A consideration of the American Framers' intent would
be inadequate without an examination of the different sources of their understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Contrary to popular belief, the Framers
were influenced by more than their English experience. By
the time the Framers began introducing and debating
amendments to the Constitution, there was already a significant body of colonial law identifying fundamental rights.
Furthermore, by 1775 the European Enlightenment was well
underway, and its influence had already extended to the
Founders of this fledgling republic.

1. The English Intent-An American Misunderstanding?
In an effort to reconcile the Framers' clear intent to
proscribe inhumane methods with the English Declaration of
Rights' prohibition of excessive punishments, it has been
suggested that the Framers' simply misunderstood their own
legal history.
However, a fresh look at the history of punishment in
England, and especially the framing of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, indicates that the Framers themselves seriously misinterpreted English law. Not only had Great
Britain developed, prior to 1689, a general policy against
excessiveness in punishments, but it did not prohibit "barbarous" punishments that were proportionate to an offense.29

However, this argument proceeds from an illogical premise.
Mr. Granucci correctly argued that the Framers intended to
prohibit inhumane forms of punishment. However, as a
concomitant to this he asserted that the Framers must have
misunderstood the intent of the English Declaration because

29.

Granucci, supra note 11, at 84a-44.
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"their interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause [was] opposite to that of the English view."30 However, this conclusion assumes that the prohibition of inhumane modes of punishment is mutually exclusive with the
proscription of excessive punishments. Clearly this is not the
case, and Granucci does not attempt to explain why it
might be.
A more plausible explanation of this American modification is that the American Framers recognized the flaw in
the English interpretation of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause and sought to remedy it. It is well established that the Americans valued the proportionality principle so greatly that they explicitly provided for it in many of
their state constitutions. "The authors of the state constitutions knew precisely how to prohibit disproportionate punishments and clearly did so."31 However, Schwartz argued
that because many of the state constitutions expressly recognized the proportionality principle, the Framers must not
have intended to include it in the Federal Bill of Rights
because they did not explicitly mention it. 32 This argument
is counterintuitive. Proceeding from the premise that the
principle was important enough to include in state constitutions, surely the Framers considered it important enough to
include in the Federal Constitution. Mter all, it was the
federal government that many of the Framers feared most.
This is consistent with the second alternative above, that
the Framers intended to expand the scope of the Clause,
not to redefine it. 33 The Framers' failure to explicitly pro-

30.
!d. at 860.
31.
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 381.
32.
!d. at 382.
33.
There are a number of possible explanations for why the Americans would
broaden the scope of the Eighth Amendment. The most likely is that they were
particularly concerned about inhumane punishments, and this concern highlighted
the weaknesses of the Declaration of Rights. There is considerable historical evidence of the early colonists' concerns with barbarous punishments.
"When the concept reached American shores, however, it took on a different
meaning. From the very beginning, Americans expressed a great concern over cruel
and unusual modes of punishment, as is illustrated in the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties (1641). Many were rarely, if ever, utilized in the colonies." Berkson, supra
note 11, at 159. Berkson further explains that in spite of the English Declaration's
focus on proportionality, "Upon introduction to North America, the concept took on
expanded meaning and emphasis was placed upon restricting the kind of punishment that might be imposed." !d. at 65 (emphasis added). However, Berkson concludes that although the excessiveness doctrine was neglected, it was not excised
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vide for proportionality by proscribing excessive punishments
is most logically understood to reflect the Framers' view
that the proportionality principle is inherent in the Eighth
Amendment, and therefore there was no need to explicitly
provide for it.

2. The Enlightenment and the Colonial Conception of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
In the abstract, the fixed historical approach to constitutional interpretation is methodologically sound. However, the
validity of any such conclusion necessarily depends on the
adequacy of the historical research. One of the fundamental
problems with the evolution of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been the Court's failure to base its opinions on
horizontally and vertically cumulative historical data. 34 It is
not enough for the Court to consider a single historical
strand of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Rather, if the Court is to indulge its preference for legal historical analysis, it must consider all historical aspects of the
prohibition's evolution.
What the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
was intended to forbid remains questionable. Acceptance of
the clause as the outcome of only 17th Century thought
and history is to ignore nearly 100 years of American
historical development. It is also a denial of 100 years of
critical thinking by the philosophers who were widely read
and influential in the new, as well as the old, world prior
to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.

from the Eighth Amendment.
As the decades and centuries wore on, the notion that the phrase restricted the degree of punishment was deemphasized, while at the same time
emphasis was placed on the idea that the phrase restricted the mode of
punishment. This led many scholars and jurists to believe that the cruel
and unusual punishment inhibition restricted only certain methods of
punishment, as is evidenced in the nineteenth century decisions of both
state and federal courts. Nevertheless, the idea that the prohibition restricted the degree as well was by no means dead.
!d. at 159 (emphasis added).
34.
In this vein, it has been noted that, "Errors are the inevitable result of the
use of incomplete historical sources. More specifically, the Court has relied on English history while slighting the importance of the Enlightenment which swept Europe and influenced the political ideology of the Framers." Schwartz & Wishingrad,
supra note 7, at 792.
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Such an omission is clearly illogical, yet that is, in effect,
the position of the Supreme Court. 35

In short, if an historical approach to interpreting the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments"
is taken, that analysis must include consideration of the
Enlightenment and its impact on the American Framers. 36
A complete discussion of the Enlightenment's role in the
development of American Eighth Amendment understanding
necessarily involves consideration of some of the European
philosophers. The most noteworthy among these are Voltaire, Montesquieu, and "especially Beccaria."37 While Voltaire, Montesquieu and others questioned the premises of
their respective criminal codes, as a group they "found their
spokesman in Cesare Beccaria, whose treatise On Crimes
and Punishments was written in Italy in 1764."38
There can be no debate regarding the influence of the
Enlightenment thinkers on the Founding Fathers. 39 Not
only do we know that the Framers were familiar with the
writings of "social critics such as Voltaire, Rousseau,
Montesquieu, and Beccaria,"40 but there is irrefutable evidence that "these ideas were studied earnestly by the revolutionary leaders, during and after the war, in an effort to

35.
!d. at 815-16.
36.
"Incorporating these Enlightenment doctrines into the historical method of
reasoning would insure that the eighth amendment becomes the viable protection it
was meant to be, rather than an historical curiosity with limited contemporary
impact." !d. at 793.
37.
!d. at 784-85.
38.
!d. at 808.
39.
It is essential not to underestimate the influence Beccaria and others had
on American thought.
The force of Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments was felt as
much in America as in Europe. There were three American translations of
Beccaria, each coupled with Voltaire's Commentary, which were published
in America before the formulation of the Bill of Rights. They became
immediately popular at both bookstores and lending libraries. In every
colony, the ideas and writing of such social critics and reformers as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Beccaria were known and often quoted.
As Justice Douglas recognized nearly two centuries later: "The Italian
jurist Beccaria and his French and English followers influenced American
thought in the critical years following our Revolution."
ld. at 813 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 450 (1956) (Douglas, J.
dissenting)).
40.
Id. at 807.
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reform their own institutions."41 Examples of this influence
can be found in state constitutions,42 correspondence between the Framers, 43 and in some of the political writings
of the period. 44 Thus, there can be little question regarding
the role of the Enlightenment in early American thought
regarding the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Not surprisingly however, it has been argued that there
is no evidence of a causal relationship between Beccaria's
writings and the Eighth Amendment. 45 However, there is a

41.
ld. at 807-08.
42.
A clear example of the Enlightenment philosophers influence is found by
examining the history of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Admittedly influenced by the French philosophers like Voltaire, Rousseau,
and Montesquieu, the delegates [to the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention] prepared both "A Declaration of Rights" taken almost verbatim
from the "Virginia Bill of Rights" and a constitution which has been
called the "closest approach to political perfection ever devised by mankind." The provision in the body of the constitution . . . reads as follows:
"The penal laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed by the future Legislature of this State, as soon as may be, and punishments made in some
cases less sanguinary and in general more proportionate to the crimes." It
is interesting to note that the emphasis seems to be more upon the proportionality between crime and punishment than on the sanguinary aspects. In other words, a limited use of torture or so-called inhuman or
barbarous types of punishment for heinous offenses might be less objectionable than the imposition of excessive terms of imprisonment, a theoretically "humane" punishment.
ld. at 821.
In personal correspondence both Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin
43.
referred to the need for proportional punishments. While he was revising Virginia's
laws in the summer of 1776 Jefferson wrote Edmund Pendleton:
Punishments I know are necessary, and I would provide them, strict and
inflexible, but proportioned to the crime. Death might be inflicted for
murther and perhaps for treason if you would take out the description of
treason all crimes which are not such in their nature. Rape, buggery & c.
punish by castration, all other crimes by working on high roads, rivers,
gallies & c. a certain time proportioned to the offense . . . . Laws thus
proportionate and mild should never be dispensed with.
ld. at 817-18. Another example of the Framers' commitment to proportionality is
found in a letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan, dated 1785.
"Franklin objected to the lack of proportionality in English Law which provided
death for offenses ranging from theft to murder. He said, '[t]o put a man to Death
for an Offense which does not deserve Death, is it not Murder?'" ld. at 822.
44.
The totality of the Enlightenment's influence on American thought is clearly
illustrated by an excerpt from the writings of William Bradford, President George
Washington's Attorney General. He "referred in his writings on criminal law to the
ideas of Montesquieu and Beccaria as having set forth the general principles upon
which penal laws ought to be founded." Id. at 823.
45.
As an illustration of the objection, Schwartz argues that simply proving
Thomas Jefferson read Beccaria does not establish that he integrated those ideas
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sound body of historical data that establishes the Framers'
familiarity with Enlightenment principles, and references
those principles as the source of at least some of the
Framers' constitutional philosophies. The proportionality
principle in the Eighth Amendment was one of these.
Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments, together
with Voltaire's and Montesquieu's works on criminal law
reform, provided the philosophical basis for the principle of
proportionality of punishment. Since these works influenced
American colonial leaders, the principle of proportionality
must necessarily be reflected in the Eighth Amendment. 46

C.

The Evolution of Proportionality in American Case Law

Although the Supreme Court has been addressing "cruel
and unusual punishment" questions for well over a centu~
ry, 47 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is still evolving. No~
where is this more apparent than in the Court's proportion~
ality decisions. Unfortunately, the Court has unnaturally
altered this evolution by artificially distinguishing between
capital and non~capital cases. The artificiality of this "dis~
tinction" is particularly significant because it lies at the
heart of the Court's and concurring Justices' opinions in
Harmelin. Therefore, it is important to examine the evolu~
tion of proportionality in capital and non-capital cases, and
understand how this distinction has affected the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
1. Proportionality in Non-capital Cases
Although the Court has been called upon to construe
the Eighth Amendment many times, proportionality has only
been at issue in a handful of cases. A review of the Court's
non-capital proportionality decisions should begin with
Weems v. United States, 48 the first and arguably most important opinion in this line of cases.

into his constitutional philosophy. "Jefferson was a widely read man; certainly no
one has seriously argued that all that he read was adopted by reference in the
Constitution." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 381.
46.
ld. at 785.
47.
The Court first addressed the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishments" in 1867. The case was Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 608 (1867). Schwartz, supra note 11, at 382.
48.
217 U.S. :~49 (1910).
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Weems, a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast
Guard and Transportation of the United States Government
of the Philippine Islands, was convicted of falsifying a "public and official document" in order to misappropriate approximately 616 pesos (Philippine currency). Following his conviction Weems was sentenced to 15 years cadena temporal.49 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court clearly
recognized the principle of proportionality for non-capital
cases and declared Weems' sentence to be "cruel and unusual."50 The precedent value of this case cannot be overstated. Weems was the first time a majority of the Supreme
Court recognized the Eighth Amendment guarantee that

49.

ld. at 358. Weems' punishment was described as follows:
The punishment of cadena temporal is from twelve years and one day
to twenty years (arts. 28 and 96), which "shall be served" in certain "penal institutions." And it is provided that "those sentenced to cadena temporal and cadena perpetua shall labor for the benefit of the state. They
shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrist; they
shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution." Arts. 105, 106. There are
besides certain accessory penalties imposed, which are defined to be (1)
civil interdiction; (2) perpetual absolute disqualification; (3) subjection to
surveillance during life. These penalties are defined as follows:
Art. 42. Civil interdiction shall deprive the person punished as
long as he suffers it, of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of person or property, participation in the family council,
marital authority, the administration of property, and the right to
dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos. Those cases are
excepted in which the law explicitly limits its effects.
Art. 43. Subjection to the surveillance of the authorities imposes the following obligations on the person punished.
1. That of fixing his domicile and giving notice thereof to the
authority immediately in charge of his surveillance, not being
allowed to change it without the knowledge and permission of said
authority in writing.
2. To observe the rules of inspection prescribed.
3. To adopt some trade, art, industry, or profession, should he
not have known means of subsistence of his own.
"Whenever a person punished is placed under the surveillance
of the authorities, notice thereof shall be given to the government
and to the governor general."
The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is the deprivation of office, even though it be held by popular election, the
deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to public office,
the disqualification to acquire honors, etc., and the loss of retirement pay, etc.

ld. at 364-65.
50.

ld. at 366-67, 377.

r
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punishments must be proportioned to crimes. 51 Furthermore, although the Harmelin Court attempted to limit the
holding in Weems, the case has never been overruled. Thus,
the Weems Court's analysis continues to be the cornerstone
of contemporary Eighth Amendment proportionality law.
Following its 1910 decision in Weems, the Court did not
revisit the issue of Eighth Amendment proportionality in a
significant way until 1958. 52 At that time the Court decided Trop v. Dulles. 53 In Trop, a native-born American was
convicted of wartime desertion, and subsequently stripped of
his United States citizenship. On appeal Trop argued that
the sentence contravened the Eighth Amendment prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishments." In its opinion the
Court observed that even after Weems, "[t]he exact scope of
the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been
detailed by this Court."54 However, in spite of that the
Court relied on the general policy rationale set forth in
Weems, 55 and held the sentence to be "cruel and unusual."
Although the Court did not find the sentence to be disproportionate, the Court implicitly recognized the validity of the
proportionality principle. 56 Hence, Trop further solidified
the role of proportionality analysis within Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The next significant development in non-capital Eighth
Amendment proportionality cases occurred in Robinson v.
California. 57 In that case the petitioner challenged the validity of a Califomia statute that made it illegal to ''be
addicted to the use of narcotics." The petitioner contended
that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment ban of
"cruel and unusual punishments." The Court's opinion was
noteworthy for two reasons. First, as in Trop, the Court
implicitly recognized the role of proportionality in Eighth
Amendment adjudication. 58 The second, and more revolu51.
ld. at 382.
52.
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 387.
fi3.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
54.
ld. at 99 (footnote omitted).
55.
ld. at 100-02.
56.
"[B ]y negative implication the Trop Court recognized the dis proportionality
principle: 'Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of
the crime.'" Schwartz, supra note 11, at 387.
57.
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
58.
!d. at 666-67.
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tionary change wrought by Robinson was the Court's extension of the Eighth Amendment to the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment. 59 Since Robinson, the Eighth Amendment has been read to proscribe "cruel and unusual punishments" at both the state and federal levels.
The fourth case to significantly affect the evolution of
the proportionality principle in non-capital cases was
Rummel v. Estelle. 60 In that case Rummel was sentenced
to life imprisonment after his third felony conviction. He
challenged the sentence on the ground that it "was so disproportionate to the crimes he had committed as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."61 However, in contrast to its decisions in Weems, Trop, and Robinson, the
Court refused to consider the disproportionality of the sentence. Rather, the Court attempted to justify its decision by
arguing that capital and non-capital cases are inherently
different, and that the length of the prison sentence imposed for a felony is "purely a matter of legislative prerogative."62 Thus, in one fell swoop, and with absolute disregard for the principle of stare decisis, the Court removed
proportionality from Eighth Amendment analysis in all noncapital cases.
The final non-capital predecessor to Harmelin that merits attention is Solem. 63 Ironically, although the facts of
this case are nearly identical to those in Rummel, it is
difficult to imagine a more antithetical opinion. Solem was
sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parol
under South Dakota's recidivist statute. He appealed contending the sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court agreed, citing the disproportionality
of the punishment as the reason for its decision. Solem,
more than any case since Weems, explicitly recognized proportionality as an element of the Eighth Amendment. 64 In
fact, for the first time since Weems recognized the principle

59.
ld. at 666-67, 675.
60.
445 U.S. 263 (19RO).
61.
Id. at 265.
ld. at 274.
62.
63.
Solem v. Helm, 468 U.S. 277 (1983).
64.
The Court wrote, "We hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the Defendant has been convicted." ld. at 290.
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of proportionality, the Court provided clear criteria for determining the Eighth Amendment's scope. 65 Thus, after Solem
and until the Court issued its decision in Harmelin, there
was little doubt that proportionality was an integral part of
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for
non-capital cases.

2. Proportionality in Capital Cases
Proportionality review of capital punishment has proven
to be far less controversial than application of the proportionality principle in non-capital cases. 66 In fact, after a
plurality of the Court recognized the proportionality principle for these cases in 1976,67 there has been little if any
question regarding the propriety of such analysis. Ironically,
perhaps the best evidence of the acceptance of proportionality in capital punishment review is found in Rummel, a
non-capital case. In that case Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, argued that because of the inherent differences
between capital punishment and all other criminal sanctions,
the use of proportionality analysis in capital cases could not
justify its application to non-capital questions. 68 However,
ignoring for the moment the validity of this distinction,
Justice Rehnquist's argument clearly reflects the Court's
strong support for applying the proportionality principle to
capital cases. Thus, the historical paradox is clear. If the
distinction between capital and non-capital cases is invalid,
the Court cannot consider the proportionality of the punishment in capital cases and disregard the proportionality principle when confronted by Eighth Amendment challenges to
non-capital sentences.

65.
"[A] Court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions." ld. at 292.
66.
"[A]fter 1971 the proportionality principle was frequently developed within
[death penalty] cases." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 388.
67.
ld. at 389.
68.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1980).
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MICHIGAN

The Facts

On May 12, 1986, Ronald Allen Harmelin was arrested
for possessing 672 grams of cocaine. He was subsequently
convicted, and sentenced under Michigan state law to a
mandatory life term without the possibility of parole. Mter
initially reversing Harmelin's conviction because of an illegal
search, 69 the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated its original
decision and affirmed the sentence. 70 In 1990 the Michigan
Supreme Court refused to hear Harmelin's appeal, 71 but
later that year the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 72
B.

The Supreme Court's Rationale

As previously indicated, there was no ml'\iority opmwn
in Harmelin. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Kennedy wrote
the concurrence, and was joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter. Finally, Justice White drafted the dissent, and was
joined in all relevant respects by Justices Blackmun,
Marshall and Stevens. Since there was no ml'\iority, there is
no single explanation of the opinion. This section will provide the reasoning of all three factions on the Court.

1.

The Court's Opinion

The essence of the Court's opmwn IS that "the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.'m To
support this conclusion Justice Scalia made a number of
arguments. Justice Scalia's first target was Solem. In his
attack he returned to Justice Rehnquist's analysis in
Rummel. He then reasserted Rummel's fundamental premise,
that the length of a sentence imposed for felonies is "purely
a matter of legislative intent." 74 Justice Scalia also contended that Solem's three-prong test is necessarily invalid

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

440 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).

!d. at 80.
434 Mich. 863 (1990).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991).
ld. at 2686.
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because it had been rejected by the Rummel Court. 75 However, he offered no rationale, and cited no authority other
than Rummel, to support either of these contentions. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia relied on these two arguments to conclude that Solem should be overruled. 76
The Court's second argument was also directed, in large
part, at Solem. Justice Scalia asserted that Solem relied
heavily upon the finding that the English Declaration of
Rights contained a proportionality guarantee. 77 He then
argued that the Declaration was intended to proscribe "illegal" methods of punishment, rather than
disproportionality. 78
Ironically, Justice Scalia's third argument is that it does
not matter what the intent of the English Declaration of
Rights was because it would have been impossible to transplant that understanding into the American legal system. 79
He argued instead, that we should only consider what the
American Framers intended. 80 He then proffered three reasons why the American Framers could not have intended
the Eighth Amendment to proscribe disproportionate punishments. He contended that had the Framers wanted to ban
disproportionate punishment, they would have done so in
clear and unambiguous language. 81 He further argued that
because proportionality analysis relies on consideration of
defined offenses, the Framers could not have intended to
proscribe disproportionality because the government "had
never before defined offenses."82 Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that the available historical evidence supports his
conclusion that the Framers did not intend to include proportionality in the Eighth Amendment. 83
The Court's next argument is that no criteria exists to
identify disproportionate punishments. "For the real-world
enterprise, the standards seem so inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

ld.
ld.
/d.
ld.
ld.
/d.
ld.
ld.
/d.

at 2684.
at 2686.
at 2690-91.
at 2691.
at 2692.
at 2693.
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subjective values."84 Justice Scalia then proceeded to indict
the Solem test by asserting that the first two prongs are
subjective and that the third "has no conceivable relevance
to the Eighth Amendment."85
Finally, he conceded that the Court has recognized the
proportionality principle in the past. However, he dismissed
those cases with three arguments. First, he attempted to
moot out Weems by arguing that the language of that case
can be read to support or reject proportionality. 86 Second,
he argued that because the Supreme Court did not explicitly
apply Weems for nearly sixty years it cannot be binding on
the Court today. 87 Finally, he dismissed the line of capital
cases recognizing proportionality by distinguishing them
from non-capital cases involving sentences for a term of
years. 88
In short, Justice Scalia argued that there is no historical, textual, or precedential justification for reading proportionality into the Eighth Amendment. While these arguments are superficially compelling, this Note will show that
they rely on internally inconsistent analysis, and are little
more than the easiest way to reach the Court's desired end.

2.

The Concurring Opinion

As could be expected, given the extreme nature of the
Court's ,()pinion, the concurrence differed fundamentally with
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The concurring
Justices, unlike Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice, felt
bound by stare decisis to recognize a "narrow proportionality
principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 80 years."89 Moreover, they acknowledged that
the proportionality principle extends to non-capital cases. 90
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy devoted most of his attention to discussing five principles that he argued "give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review." 91

R4.
85.
86.
87.
R8.
89.
90.
91.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld.

at 2697.
at 2697-98.
at 2700.
at
at
at
at

2701.
2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27oa.
2703-05.
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The first of these principles is that "the fixing of prison
terms for specific crimes involves a substantive penological
judgment" that should be left to the legislatures. 92 Justice
Kennedy then argued from this premise that courts should
give "substantial deference" to this legislative determination
when reviewing sentences under Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges. 93 In essence, the concurrence argued
that legislatively imposed sentences are presumptively constitutional, and that this presumption can only be overcome
by a showing of gross disproportionality.
The second principle identified by Justice Kennedy is
that under the Eighth Amendment, legislatures are free to
adopt any theory of punishment they see fit. 94 This argument, like the first, was intended to support the notion that
a legislatively prescribed sentence carries a presumption
that is not easily overcome. Hence, a court cannot find that
a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment merely because
it disagrees with the penological theory underlying the statute.
Justice Kennedy's third principle is also intended to
strengthen the presumption that legislatively mandated
sentences enjoy. In essence, he argued that because legislatures are free to disagree with one another about theories of
punishment, they inevitably impose sentences that vary in
degree. 95 Thus, before a court can reject a legislatively
mandated sentence because it is more excessive than those
imposed in other states, it must be established that the
different legislatures were operating under the same
penological philosophy.
The fourth principle is that "proportionality review by
federal courts should be informed by 'objective factors to the
maximum possible extent."'96 Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy did not propose any such standards. Instead, he merely
pointed out that there is a clear distinction between capital
and non-capital cases, and that the lack of any such criteria
for non-capital cases explains why so few non-capital sen-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

ld. at 2703.
ld. at 2703-04.
ld. at 2704.
!d.
!d.
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tences have been found to be disproportionate. 97 However,
this need for objective criteria does not justify rejection of
the Solem test, as the Court advocated. On the contrary, if
Solem's are the most objective criteria available, then
Justice Kennedy's need for "objective factors" operates as a
warrant for Solem's three-prong test.
Finally, Justice Kennedy cited Solem and Weems for the
proposition that "the Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between crime and sentence."98 He
argued that it proscribes only "grossly disproportionate"
sentences. 99 Unfortunately, as with principle four, Kennedy
provided no criteria for determining when a punishment is
"grossly disproportionate." He simply asserted that this
should be the first inquiry by reviewing courts, and unless
"a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality" the court need not inquire further. 100
However, in the absence of any criteria for determining
what is "grossly disproportionate," this position is internally
inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's fourth principle, that
"objective factors" must be used in proportionality review.
These two principles contradict one another because absent
an
objective criteria for
determining "gross
disproportionality," Justice Kennedy is forcing courts to
subjectively determine whether a punishment is "grossly
disproportionate," and therefore unconstitutional. Furthermore, requiring a showing of "gross disproportionality" fundamentally alters the proportionality principle by raising the
threshold at which a punishment becomes unconstitutional,
and thereby limiting the scope of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of all "cruel and unusual punishments."

3.

The Dissenting Opinion

The first part of the dissenting opmwn refutes Justice
Scalia's rationale. Justice White's first point was that proportionality is implicit in the spirit and structure of the
Eighth Amendment. To support this conclusion Justice
White cited Benjamin Oliver, who was also cited by Justice

97.
98.
99.
100.

!d. at 2705.

ld.
ld.
!d. at 2707.
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Scalia. 101 Oliver first reasoned that the prohibition of excessive bail and fines was intended to indirectly limit courts'
authority to imprison offenders by imposing bail and fines
that the defendant's were incapable of paying. 10:.l Second,
Oliver argued that the spirit of the Eighth Amendment
requires a proportionality limit on courts' and legislatures'
discretion to imprison.
In the absence of all express regulations on the subject, it
would surely be absurd to imprison an individual for a
term of years, for some inconsiderable offence, and consequently it would seem, that a law imposing so severe a
punishment must be contrary to the intention of the framers of the constitution. 103

Justice White's second argument was that there were
sufficient legal standards in 1787 to make consideration of
proportionality possible. "[T]he people of the new Nation had
been living under the criminal law regimes of the States,
and there would have been no lack of benchmarks for determining unusualness." 104 Justice White's final response to
Justice Scalia was that there is insufficient historical evidence to justify the Court's conclusion that the Framers did
not intend the Eighth Amendment to encompass proportionality.105
Mter specifically refuting Justice Scalia, Justice White
made three other significant arguments. First, he pointed
out that the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the
proportionality principle on several occasions. 106 He
strengthened this argument by pointing out, "[n]ot only is it
undeniable that our cases have construed the Eighth
Amendment to embody a proportionality component, but it
is also evident that none of the Court's cases suggest that

ld. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2710.
ld. at 2710.
lOfi.
"Even if one were to accept the argument that the First Congress did not
have in mind the proportionality issue, the evidence would hardly be strong
enough to come close to proving an affirmative decision against the proportionality
component." ld.
106.
"Among others, Justice White specifically cites the Court's opinions in Gregg
v. Georgia, 42R U.S. 153 (1976), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 5H4 (1977), and
Enmund v. Florida, 45R U.S. 7R2 (1982)." ld. at 2711-12.

101.
102.
10:1.
104.
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such a construction is impermissible." 107 Thus, in spite of
the Court's assertion to the contrary, one can confidently
conclude that Supreme Court precedent supports the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality guarantee.
Justice White's third argument is that Justice Scalia's
acceptance of proportionality in capital cases is logically
inconsistent with his rejection of the proportionality principle in non-capital cases. 108 Justice White argued that the
Court "ignore[d] the generality of the Court's several pronouncements about the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
component. And it fail[ed] to explain why the words 'cruel
and unusual' include a proportionality requirement in some
cases but not in others." 109 Justice White concluded,
The Court's capital punishment cases requiring proportionality reject Justice Scalia's notion that the Amendment
bars only cruel and unusual modes or methods of punishment. Under that view, capital punishment-a mode of
punishment-would either be completely barred or left to
the discretion of the legislature. Yet neither is true. The
death penalty is appropriate in some cases and not in
others. The same should be true of punishment by imprisonment.110

Justice White's fourth and final major contention is that
the Eighth Amendment has never been and should never be
bound by purely historical considerations. 111 Rather, Justice White argued the Court has long recognized the evolving nature of the Eighth Amendment. 112 He suggested that
the test for this evolution is the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 113
Implicit in this test is that the standard must be a contemporary, rather than a historical, conception of humanity. "In
evaluating a punishment under this test, 'we have looked

107.
!d. at 2711.
108.
!d. at 2712.
109.
!d.
110.
!d.
111.
!d.
112.
Citing the Court's opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. :i61, 369 (1989) Justice White observed that the Court "has 'not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to "barbarous" methods that were generally outlawed
in the 18th century,' but instead has interpreted the Amendment 'in a flexible and
dynamic manner.'" !d.
113.
!d. at 2712 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 3fi6 U.S. 86, 101(1958)).
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not to our own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole' in determining what standards have evolved." 114 The essence of Justice White's
opinion is that contemporary American society has evolved
to the point that the Eighth Amendment must be construed
to include a proportionality guarantee.

IV.

ANALYSIS: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE
CONSTITUTION, GUIDES FOR PROPORTIONALITY
ANALYSIS WITHIN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Although the Eighth Amendment does not contain the
word "proportionality," the average American probably believes that disproportionate criminal punishments violate the
constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments." Nevertheless, in Harmelin the Court would completely destroy the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
guarantee, while the concurring justices would render it
completely impotent. The two opinions make a number of
arguments premised on the following: 1) the Framers did
not intend the Eighth Amendment to guarantee proportionality of all criminal punishments; 2) Supreme Court precedent does not establish a proportionality guarantee for noncapital cases; and 3) capital and non-capital punishments
are constitutionally distinguishable. Having asserted these
arguments either implicitly or explicitly, the Court and concurring justices reach their respective conclusions. The Court
concluded that there is no proportionality guarantee for noncapital cases. The concurring justices determined that while
the Eighth Amendment does guarantee proportionality, the
presumption afforded state legislatures can only be overcome
by a showing of "gross disproportionality." While both opinions are superficially compelling, neither withstands equitable and logical scrutiny. Because the logical foundations of
the two opinions are the same, refutation of those three
premises invalidates both the Court's and the concurring
Justices' opinions.

A. Proportionality Analysis is Historically Justified
While historical evidence may be read to support the
conclusion that the Framers did not intend the Eighth
114.

!d.
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Amendment to guarantee proportionality in all cases, an
important caveat exists. When examining available evidence,
that information must be placed in its historical context. In
fact, after considering the theoretical underpinnings of the
Eighth Amendment, some commentators have concluded that
"[t]he legislative history of the eighth amendment gives no
indication that the Framers intended to proscribe only specific forms of punishment." 115 Those commentators emphasize that there were only two dominant theories of punishment in America in the late Eighteenth Century, and both
support the inclusion of proportionality within the Eighth
Amendment. 116 "[W]e cannot treat lightly the fact that the
only two significant contemporary theories of punishment
[retributivism and utilitarianism] both emphasized a single
limitation-proportionality between crime and punishment."117 This fact, and the continuing role of retributive
and utilitarian philosophies in our criminal justice system,
has caused one commentator to observe:
Since it has been the cornerstone of penological thinking
and practice in Western civilization for centuries, since it
dominated when the eighth amendment was adopted, and
since it underlay the document from which the amendment
was drawn, proportionality stands as the underlying principle most surely relied upon by the amendment's Framers.
Furthermore, since retributive and utilitarian considerations continue to dominate our penal structure, there is
little reason to believe that the constitution has outgrown
the proportionality requirement. 118

B. Stare Decisis Mandates Adherence to the Proportionality
Principle in All Cases
In considering Supreme Court precedent in this area it
is important to remember the distinction the Court drew in
Rummel, and attempted to draw in this case, between proportionality in capital and non-capital settings. There is a
consensus that the Eighth Amendment mandates proportionality analysis in capital cases. Therefore, this section will

115.

Wheeler, supra note 6, at 853.

116.

!d.

117.
11R.

!d.
!d. at 8fi3-fi4.
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address the implications of that concession, and the
precedential justifications for applying the proportionality
principle to non-capital cases. The most compelling evidence
that the Supreme Court has already extended proportionality to non-capital cases are the Court's opinions in Weems,
Trop, and Robinson. These cases have caused commentators
to observe, "the eighth amendment has been held to be
evolutionary and to limit both the amount and nature of
permissible punishment." 119
1.

\

Weems v. United States

Given the revolutionary nature of the Court's holding in
Weems, it should not be surprising that Justice Scalia felt
compelled to attempt to reconcile the Court's holding in
Harmelin with the proportionality analysis in Weems. However, Justice Scalia's efforts were logically inconsistent and
are strong evidence that the Weems Court did in fact recognize the need for proportionality of sentences for "terms of
years." Referring to Weems, Justice Scalia argued, "[t]hat
holding, and some of the reasoning upon which it was
based, was not at all out of accord with the traditional
understanding of the proVISIOn we have described
above." 120 The emphasis in that sentence must be upon
the word "some," because there is little question that much
of the Court's rationale in Weems is mutually exclusive with
Justice Scalia's reading of the Eighth Amendment.
For example, the Weems Court argued, "it is a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to the offense." 121 The Court did not qualify this statement by distinguishing between methods of
punishment, or between capital and non-capital cases.
Rather, the Court very clearly recognized the universality of
the proportionality principle. Further evidence that the
Weems Court did not base its decision exclusively on the
unique nature of the punishment imposed is that the Court
specifically referred to both the nature and degree of punishment in justifying its decision. "Its punishments come
under condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on account of

119.
120.
121.

!d. at 842.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2699 (1991).
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. ::!49, ::!66-67 (1910).

176

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[VOLUME 7

their degree and kind." 122 The Court clearly indicated
"both" degree and kind, independent of one another, invalidated the sentence. It is this part of the Weems Court's
analysis that is irreconcilable with Harmelin, and that has
caused commentators to argue that Weems clearly recognized
the application of the proportionality principle in all cases,
regardless of the mode of punishment imposed. 123 Had the
Weems Court intended that sentence to be read conjunctively
rather than disjunctively it would not have used the word
"both." Certainly the author of the opinion recognized that
using the word ''both" was inconsistent with interpreting the
sentence as Justice Scalia would like. Thus, if we are to
afford each word in that sentence meaning, then either the
degree or mode of punishment may be sufficiently "cruel
and unusual" to invalidate a sentence.
Finally, the logical inconsistency of Justice Scalia's argument is illustrated by his assertion that Weems can be read
to apply to either disproportionate modes of punishment
alone, or to both disproportionate modes and degrees of
punishment. 124 Because these two positions are diametrically opposed, Justice Scalia's assertion cannot possibly be
correct. The suggestion that Weems applies only to modes of
punishment is an "all or nothing'' proposition. Thus, if any
part of the Weems opinion must be read to apply to the

122.
ld. at 377.
123.
"In Weems the Court made it clear that the amendment also limits the
amount of permissible punishment . . . " Wheeler, supra note 6, at 842.
"[In Weems] the Court broadened its prior eighth amendment analysis by finding that an otherwise acceptable sentence can be so disproportionate to the offense
for which it is imposed as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." Martin R.
Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Exces·
sive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103, 1113.
The Weems Court's proportionality analysis and the language of the opinion
suggest that a sentence could, solely because of its length, be so disproportionate
to a particular crime as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." ld. at 1114.
124.
Scalia wrote:
Since it contains language that will support either theory, our later opinions have used Weems, as the occasion required, to represent either the
principle that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments
that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the
crime committed, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), or the principle that only a "unique . . . punishment," a form of imprisonment different from the "more traditional forms . . . imposed under the AngloSaxon
system," can violate the Eighth Amendment, Rummel, 445 U.S., at 274275.
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700.
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degree of punishment, Justice Scalia must be wrong. His
narrow interpretation, that Weems only applies to modes of
punishment, renders much of the analysis in that opinion
superfluous or moot. As indicated above, the Weems Court
clearly considered both the mode of punishment and the
degree. Thus Weems cannot be read as he suggests, but
must instead be read to mandate proportionality analysis in
all cases.

2.

Trop v. Dulles

While clearly enunciating a principle of proportionality
for non-capital cases, Weems fell short of defining the limits
of this analysis. However, in Trop, the Court reaffirmed the
role of proportionality analysis in non-capital cases and
further defined the scope of the Eighth Amendment. In fact,
the Trap Court defined the term "unusual" which lies at the
heart of the debate about whether the Eighth Amendment
proscription is limited to unconventional modes of punishment. Mter citing previous Supreme Court cases, the Trap
Court observed, "the Court simply examines the particular
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against
inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of
meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual."' 125
Hence, Trap can and should be read to preclude Justice
Scalia's narrow construction of the term unusual, as applying only to modes of punishment. Additionally, the inconsistency of this construction with the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is further evidenced by the Trap Court's
conclusion that even if "unusual" is construed independent
of "cruel," the word's meaning does not limit the Clause to
only modes of punishment. "If the word 'unusual' is to have
any meaning apart from the word 'cruel', however, the
meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something
different from that which is generally done." 126 Thus, to
satisfy the Trop Court's definition, it need only be shown
that a punishment has been applied atypically, not that the
mode of punishment imposed is out of the ordinary. This
clearly was the case in Harmelin. In fact, at the time the
Harmelin court issued its opinion, Michigan was the only

12fi.
126.

Trop v. Dulles, :Hi6 U.S. R6, 100 n. 82 (19fiR).
Id. at 100-01.
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state in the country to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the illegal possession
of narcotics. 127 This alone constitutes "something different
from that which is generally done."

3.

Robinson v. California

The third, and perhaps most illustrative case in which
the proportionality principle was applied without exclusive
regard for the mode of punishment being used was
Robinson. Because this case only involved imprisonment, it
cannot be argued that the proportionality principle was
applied to an "unusual" mode of punishment. In fact, the
Robinson Court made it very clear that the mode of punishment in that case was not a consideration. 128 Therefore, in
an effort to distinguish Robinson, Justice Scalia attempted
to argue that Robinson may not have actually been applying
the proportionality principle. 129 This argument has a number of flaws. First, Justice Scalia gave no reason to believe
that the Robinson Court did not rely on the proportionality
principle. Second, such an assertion is contrary to the analysis proffered by the Robinson Court. 130 Third, Justice
Scalia offered no alternative explanation for invalidating
Robinson's sentence. Finally, Justice Scalia's assertion that
the Robinson court did not apply the proportionality principle patently contradicts his introduction of Robinson. Justice
Scalia wrote, "[t]he first holding of this Court unqualifiedly
applying a requirement of proportionality to criminal penalties was issued 185 years after the Eighth Amendment was
adopted." 131 He then cited Robinson as that case. 132
Clearly, the latter of these references to Robinson by Justice
Scalia is inconsistent with his assertion that "there is no
reason to believe that the decision was an application of the
principle of proportionality." 133 Given the lack of support
for Justice Scalia's assertion, the logical inconsistency of his
statements, and the plain language of the Robinson opinion,

127.
128.
129.
130.
1:-ll.
132.
133.

Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2718 (1991).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962).
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701 n.14.
Robinson, 370 U.S. 660.
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. 2700-01.
ld. at n.14.
ld.
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there is no question that the Robinson Court recognized the
propriety of invalidating a prison sentence because it is
disproportionate to the crime committed.

Proportionality is Consisten"t with the Text and Structure
of the Constitution

B.

Perhaps the most significant weakness in the Court's
and concurring Justices' opinions is the implicit assertion
that the Constitution generally, or the Eighth Amendment
specifically, differentiates between capital and non-capital
cases. Ironically, even if this is true, the distinction favors
the consideration of proportionality in non-capital cases
regardless of the mode of punishment involved. The second
fundamental and fallacious premise is that whatever the
Eighth Amendment meant in 1791, is what it should mean
today. This contention is insupportable historically, structurally, and textually. In fact, commentators and the Court
itself, have forcefully argued that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment evolves with society to reflect contemporary
social mores and conceptions of justice.
1. The Eighth Amendment Text does not Distinguish between Modes of Punishment, or Capital and Non-capital
Cases

Contrary to the Court's implication, the Eighth Amendment does not distinguish between types of punishment or
types of cases. Hence, such distinctions cannot justify the
application of the proportionality principle to some cases or
modes of punishment, but not to others. Proportionality
analysis within the Eighth Amendment is an all or nothing
proposition. If it is justified in one case, or relative to one
mode of punishment, it must always be considered. The
Supreme Court explicitly affirmed this rationale in Robinson.
A punishment out of all proportion to the offense may
bring it within the ban against "cruel and unusual punishments." . . . So may the cruelty of punishment, as, for
example, disemboweling a person alive . . . . But the principle that would deny power to exact capital punishment
for a petty crime would also deny power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being sick. 134

1::!4.

Robinson v. California, ::!70 U.S. 660, 676 (1962).
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Hence, given Justice Scalia's concession that proportionality
must be considered in capital cases, there is no justification
for not applying the proportionality principle to non-capital
cases involving sentences for terms of years.

2. The Structure of the Constitution Requires Consideration
of Proportionality
There is little dispute that the Eighth Amendment proscribes disproportionate fines and bail. This requirement
stems from the word "excessive" in the Clause itself. Thus,
there has been considerable debate about whether the
Framers would have prohibited the imposition of disproportionate fines or bail, without intending that the same prohibition apply to other available criminal sanctions. This paradox is particularly revealing when applied to Harmelin. Justice Scalia persuasively argued that it was not inconsistent
for the Framers to apply this prohibition to fines and bail,
but not to other modes of punishment.
There is good reason to b~ concerned that fines, uniquely
of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of
accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence.
Imprisonment, corporal punishment and even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue.
As we have recognized in the context of other constitutional provisions, it makes sense to scrutinize governmental
action more closely when the State stands to benefit. 135

However, Justice Scalia's rationale is logically deficient in
two ways. First, his argument is valid only if proportionality
analysis is not extended to any mode of punishment that
does not have the potential to create revenue for the state.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia conceded that the proportionality principle should be applied to capital punishment,
which he admits costs the state money, rather than producing income. 136 On this level, even under Justice Scalia's
analysis, there is no distinction between imprisonment and
capital punishment. Therefore, if the structure of the Eighth
Amendment supports extension of the proportionality princi-

135.
136.

Harrnelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 26HO, 2693 n.9 (1991).
ld.
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pie to capital cases, it applies with equal force m all noncapital cases.
The second flaw in Justice Scalia's analysis is that he
assumes the economic benefits of imprisonment never exceed
its cost. However, Harmelin is a good illustration of an
exception to this generalization. If, as in the case of drug
distribution, the societal costs exceed the costs of imprisonment, a state legislature may be economically motivated to
impose excessive prison terms to eliminate these drains on
its state's economy.
In short, the spectrum of available criminal sanctions
ranges from fines to capital punishment. The Court implicitly argued that the structure of the Eighth Amendment
supports proportionality analysis in both of those situations,
but does not justify application of the principle to imprisonment. The logical inconsistency of, and lack of support for,
that view leads to the conclusion that the structure of the
Amendment mandates application of the proportionality
principle in all non-capital cases regardless of the mode of
punishment imposed.

3.

The Eighth Amendment Must be Allowed to Evolve

All laws must be applied in light of their intended
effects. Thus, the formulation of a judicious Eighth Amendment theory must begin with an examination of the philosophical underpinnings of the Amendment. The Court has,
on several occasions, advanced its view of the Amendment's
purpose. In Robinson, Justice Douglas observed, "[t]he
Eighth Amendment expressed the revulsion of civilized man
against barbarous acts - the 'cry of horror' against man's
inhumanity to his fellow man." 137 This view was echoed by
the majority in Trap.
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and
unusual" has not been detailed by this Court. But the
basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established
in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice . . . .
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has
the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that

137.

Robinson, B70 U.S. at 676.
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this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.13H

Thus, as society's conceptions of humanity and justice
evolve, so must the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
"cruel and unusual punishments."

V.

CONCLUSION

As is so often true, the outcome of this case was largely
determined by the philosophical predilections of the Supreme
Court Justices. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued persuasively that the Eighth Amendment should be
strictly construed within the parameters of the text and
structure of the document, and that such a construction
precludes recognition of proportionality in non-capital cases.
The concurring Justices, on the other hand, grudgingly acknowledge the Court's precedent in this area, and were
willing to concede that stare decisis mandates recognition of
a minimal proportionality guarantee in all cases. However,
one should not be deceived by the apparent difference in
these opinions. In practice,- the results are virtually identical. If possible the Court would eliminate the proportionality
component of the Eighth Amendment, while the concurring
Justices would choose instead, to leave the Eighth Amendment a hollow shell.
Given the similarity in their outcomes, it is understandable that both approaches suffer from the same infirmities.
Both the court and the concurring Justices want to have
their cake and eat it too. The Justices emphasized the narrowness of the text and structure of the Eighth Amendment,
but willingly recognize an exception for capital cases. Yet
neither opinion justified this exception in terms of either the
text or structure. Similarly, both opinions emphasized the
intent of the Framers, and the importance of being bound
by history. Yet, both opinions disregard the substantial body
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has recognized the
proportionality principle and the evolving nature of the
proportionality principle.
There was no majority in this case, thus the Court will
eventually be called upon to revisit this issue. When this

138.

Trap, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (19fi8).
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occurs, the Court should carefully consider not only the text
and structure of the Amendment, but should examine with
equal care and respect its own precedent. Moreover, the
Court should be guided by the need for a consistent body of
Eighth Amendment law. Finally, the Court must remember
that it is the Constitution which they have been called upon
to interpret, and that as such it cannot survive static interpretations such as Harmelin.
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it
is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the
form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
particularly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are,
to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can
approach it." 139

John C. Rooker
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Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).

